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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

l)f(

Case No. 19050

LLE NAYLOR,

Jl J t'.

Oefenda nt-Respondent.
- - -ex>oO ex>o- - -

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff husband
H.µpeals frum thP granting of his former wife's petition to increase and
enntmuP alimony and to increase child support.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a day-long trrnl, the Honorable Scott Daniels
111c·neasPd thr> ;ippellant's alimony obligation by $100 to $600 per month,
"' uu·1'd that al!Tnony be continued for an additional five-year period,

1n.·r•'H'··1l r:hJd support by $150 to $400 per month.

Hnd

• 1·11

...,

II

(Tr. at 75, R.

fmdi.1gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 129-32)

'"'"!
1·111

•lrkr IR

;it 140-421 were entered by the District

r. • ,,, .i ion tiled by appellant (R. at 121-23) was denied
: l'

ii

t l 1:l 44).

Detendant

"·l'" 1 "'

that this Court affirm if,

11,

--;,[l.;•t,

and award to her tt1e arlrlitwnaJ

0

NHylur

respPctfully requests

t1rd1·r ot

11,.

oui1se!

(Pc>S

the District Court

she has incurred as a

result of this appeai.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 9, lq78, the' Honorable David K. Winder, then judge
of the District Court

111

Salt Lake County, entered a Decree of Divorce

terminating the eleven and one-half year marriage between the parties.
(R. at 43-46.)
"Dr.

tlif>t marriage, plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter

Naylor") attended medical school, obtained his doctor's degree,

completed his residency and internship, and became a practicing
(Tr. at li, R. at 160A.)

The original Decree provided for

alimony io defendar:1 respondent (hereinafter "Mrs. Naylor") of $500 per
month tor a period of five years (Decree 13, R. at 44) and awarded child
support in the amount of $250 a month for Dr. Naylor's son, who was
placed in the custody of Mrs. Naylor (_!_<:!.).
At the time of the original Decree, Dr. Naylor had just begun
practicing medicir1e and was determined hy Judge Winder to be earning
$2,600 per month.

<Findings '115, R. at 3o.J

hand, was a hair stylist and was tound

t:;

month at the time of the original Ile<'rte
plated at that tim<c that ,\lr"s

llH ,,, .r-'o

""

Naylor, on the other

have net earnings of $702 per
11<1

., .,

)

Both parties contem-

w"uld substantially

l

r1 (' t

J

'""){)

H

"' ·1 v.uuld not be necessary beyond the initial five

f

's
'.1"1

'1:1(

tt1e 0ri!'."'&I DPf'ree.

1''""""''"1p 1.'
ant1c11.rnten
Pll'

'"nt

1;,·,

(Findings tl(b), R. at 130;

'J;i (1 -

l'

jr,.:omG

Mrs. Naylor's income did not increase as

was ""r unrefuted testimony at trial that her actual
only $720 per month before taxes (Tr. at 7, R. at

W!iS

&nd Exhibit D-2) as compared with a net income of $702 per month at

the time of thC' r1riginal Decree (Findings 15, R. at 35).

Moreover,

i11llation, combined v.ith the fact that the parties' son has now reached
tus teens

has resulted in a substantial increase in monthly household

expenses tor

Naylor.

It was her unrefuted testimony that her

C'urren t monthly expenses were in excess of $2, 000 per month.
R. at 158 Hnd Exhibit D-1.)

(Tr. at 8,

Thus, at the time of the modification hear-

•.!rs. Naylor faced a substantial monthly deficiency between her
BVBLlable income and her expenses, which had resulted in her having had
to bor-row more than $13,000 from her parents by the time of trial.

(Tr.

at Y. R. at 159. l
Pr,

tne other hand, Dr. Naylor has enjoyed a dramatic increase

'" WC'•cme sm'-e the original Decree.
ui!l v s

1 ,,,, _,
"'

>lT•rl

1

re,

He has become a "partner" (techni-

in his professional corporation (Tr. at 50, R. at

ivc.o a base pay of $5, 000 per month (Tr. at 36, R. at 185).
substantial annual bonuses from his profes-

NAvl1" "'"

'" ,,,,-r,
'" 1

1 -\r'I'

to at least $24, 000 in 1980 and at
Hr. at 4.)

Contrary to the assertion in

his Brief (App. Br. at 4). Dr. Naylor rcpeatPdly testified at the
modification hearing that l-te

ari11. 1 1\cil<:!

i

i1A1 his 1982 bonus would be

comparable with those h1c- trnri r.-c<ei" -" ,,, P'lrilPr yP.ars (Tr. at 37 and
67, R. at 186 and 216).

Jn adcil\10,--

$75,000 in 1979, $84,000 in 1980

u-,

taxable income, which was

and $83,SOO m 1981 (Tr. at 59, R. at

208), Dr. Naylor receives substantial tax tree pension and profit

sharing contributions (Tr. at 71, R. at 220).

These contributions are

made by the professional corporation, 'lre not deducted from his salary,
and total approximately 25 percent of that salary.
220.)

(Tr. at 71. R. at

Thus, Dr. Naylor's total income at the present time, considering

his base salary, his b0m1ses, his pension contributions and his profit
sharing contributions, are approximately $100, 000 per year, a dramatic
increase over the $2, 600 per month found by Judge Winder at the time of
the orig1nr,_\ Decree.
J•,Jd ge Daniels fourid that Dr. N aylor's substantial increase
in income as well as the increased living expenses encountered by
Mrs. Naylor constituted a change of circumstances necessitating
modification of the original Decree's alimony and child support
provisions.

(Tr. at 76, R. at 225 and Findings 'H, R. 130-31.)

Then,

based upon the need der.ionstraled by Mrs. Naylor and Dr. Naylor's
demonstrated earnings capability, Judge Daniels ordered that alimony be
increased from $500 per month to $fi00 per month and continued for an
additior1al five years and that child support be mcreased from $250 to

$41111 i'"r · 1or1lt·

r·J·. . vl 1 l1'::---

· '·

t '-

'""''e·:.

R. 131-32.)

Additionally, based upon

her financial circumstances were such that

1 -l11'•r1"'

· 1· tu pay her own attor·ney's fees
''" •

"' '•1c1r1c1

rces

f'()•l1'i

U, H

"l

Tr. at 12, R. at

ordered Dr., Naylor to pay $1,000 towards those

t411.

Dr.

Naylor's Rule 60(b) motion having been

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE ALIMONY PROVISIONS OP THE ORIGINAL

DECREE REMAINED SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION.
The principal argument raised by appellant is that, since the
rw1ginal Decree provided alimony for a specific number of years, the
D1stnct Court exceeded its power in modifying the alimony provisions of
that ne ... ree ever· if a substantial change in relevant circumstances had
occ:urred.

This argument that the alimony provisions of the original

Decree (being phrased in terms of a specific number of years) were
fllJsol 11te and immutable is directly contrary to both statutory mandate
and tlw riedsions of this Court.
The Legislature has clearly given the district courts the
pnw('r

and resnonsibtlity to make such subsequent modification in any

llecre.•

r<'i<nrdlt>ss of its original terms, as may be appropriate and
S.:1:,., .. Jll·1 5, l'tah Code Annotated (1953 as amended),

!i
The court -.;,•
()f"
•H w nrrlcrs with
make sueh
RlHf
mH1nl,.·n11nce
of the
respect to the
parties. the cu1:1 -1y if)t iht> r>htldrPn and their
r.r thP distribution of
support and
the property as shttJt 1"1e rt=-a:;cJilHbJ\ anrl necessary.
I

In light of the clear mandate ul i.tns

the contention of

appellant that the District Court lacked the power and jurisdiction to
moJ1fy his alimony obligation is unienable.
The contentior1 of Dr. Naylor that his alimony obligation is
not modifiable because it was based upon a stipulated property
settlement was con:;1dered <J.nd unequivocally rejected by this Court in
Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944 (1953).

In that

case, the husband was a physician who reached a stipulated property
with his wife in connection with their divorce.

This

agreer1l<2nt, which hHCi b·'CEL approved by the trial court in the original
action, included the dislr1but10n of the parties' property and provided
for fixed monthly payments.

Following the entry of the original decree,

the hu5band's health forced hirn to terminate much of his medical
practice and he moved for modification of the decree so as to reduce his
monthly obligation.

ThP district court granted this motion and, on

appeal, the wife contended that the 'Jrigir1al decree "requiring monthly
payments [was] not subject to morl1ficat1nr1 !since] it was based upon an
agreement for property settlement and

thHI

not fall within the accepted clPf:nn ,, ,-,

,;

945-46.

Thus, the issue

µr"SPYl1<-"I

"'"

lh• [JHyments required [did]
q111,1i\

r,,·,·c1si>\v

••• "

t11<:

261 P. 2d at

content10n raised

11• 1f.,
!

I

<

80

-

1.c ·c·:P"I

ac1ion.

In language as applicable to the

thET1 before it, this Court held that the

the

was modifiable upon the demonstration of a
,,.-,, c:c.•1ng" c.t circumstances, even though based upon a stipulated

There is no statement anywhere in the agreement
thttt the monthly payments constituted payment for
[the husband's] interest in property decreed to
[the w1Je J. • • •
We further hold that these
[mom hl y payment l provisions are not an inseparable
part of the agreement relating to division of
property and thet by approval of the agreement in
1 he
decree the court did not divest itself of
Jurisdiction under the statute to make such subsequent changes and orders with respect to alimony
payments as might be reasonable and proper, based
i;pon change of circumstances. We hold this to be
true_ even though the provisions of the agreement
be interpreted to mean that the parties
intended to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable
am<_:lunt__of monthly alimon¥. The object and purpose
Of the statute is to give the courts power to
enforce, after divorce, the duty of support which
exists between a husband and wife or parent and
child.
Legislators who enacted the law were
1-wobably aware of a fact, which is a matter of
common knowledge to trial courts, that parties to
d1vorC'e suits frequently enter into agreements
relative to alimony or for child support which, if
hmding upon lhe courts, would leave children or
divm·cttJ wifes inadequately provided for.
It is
ttiPrefo.re reasonable to assume that the law was
rnlendeci lo give courts power to disregard the
st1r .. tJttt1011s or agreements of the parties in the
1·1r·.1 1,-.<:tanre and enter judgment for such alimony
'"
•:h•id s,1pport as appears reasonable,
and to
[t,..,, ... ,,_.c ,,,..cjifv such agreements when changeot'
'· 1.. ,,, .•-•.
justifies it, regardless of attempts
.i 11"
r
the matter by contract.
1:

i

r

11(

dtJi

:1urHies

r:· ,,,., ''!! ,.

herein cited such a view
t1 not universally adhered to

by the i;ourt:,;.
l i ll
twld .,1 twrwise in this
case in which a tiush>1rid ,,.q.:, for H reduction of
it would
prf'ce<1e11t which in
future cases m;ghl p1°event divorced wives in
serious distress from obtH1mng increased alimony
from ex-husbands possessed of wealth or ample
income to provide for them. We hold that the trial
court had power and jurisdiction to modify the
decree of divorce with respect to the payments
involved herein.
261 P. 2d at 948-49 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the District Court

had the power and jurisdiction to modify Dr. Naylor's alimony obligation
in this case.
This issue was again before this Court in Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 527 P. 2d 1359 (Utah 1974).

In that case, the wife petitioned

the trial court to modify the alimony and child support payments based
upo11

former husband's 50 percent increase in earnings and an

inflationary increase in che cost of living.

The trial court concluded

that these factors constituted a substantial change of circumstances
that justified an increase in both alimony and child support.

On

appeal, the husband contended "that in the original decree [the wife]
was awarded the family home in lieu of substantial alimony payments, and
such a property settlement should be deemed res judicata and held to
preclude any subsequent modification of alimony."

527 P.2d at 1360.

After referring to and quoting Se<:'t1on 10 3- 5, this Court held:
In accordance with tf1is ofatute, this court
has held thHt a pr
Le "'"difv a divorce
decree is Pqu1table B"d · h" same authority is
conferred upon thP r11Ftl """lit to 111HkP subsequent
changes as respPC'I to :rnpport and mttintern1nce as it

with them originally. • • •
[l]n
t1or1, the trial court has considerable
,41it1_,de «I d"cretion in adjusting financial and
"'':"''''t\. "''"'·esls, and its actions are indulged
with A pH"8un1ption of validity. The burden is upon
•n prove that the evidence clearly
against the findings as made; or that
tr,c-r? wHs a misunderstanding or misapplication of
ttic lsw .resultmg in substantial and prejudicial
'"r-r0r
vr a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.

• c,u!d

.,

·J1•1rircl'

·.< .. Hlt

H•

527 P. 2d at 1360 (footnote citations omitted).

In the present case, the

evidence presented at the trial clearly supports the trial court's
findings of fact; Dr. Naylor does not claim that inequity has resulted;
and lhe OIBtrict Court's determination that the alimony obligation was
modifiable 1s consistent with firmly established Utah law.
From as early as 1916, in Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac.
rn1 (l!Hb!, to as recently as 1981, in Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d
44 il'tah 1981), this Court has consistently recognized and adhered to

thE precept that both alimony and property distributions remain
n1od1f19ble upon the showing of a substantial change of circumstances
of whether the original award was stipulated or litigated.
contC!llion of Dr. Naylor that the District Court lacked the power or
J·1r1s<11ct1on

lo modity his alimony obligation is without merit.

H•!NT II.

MODIFICATION OF THE ALIMONY AND SUPPORT

''""'"l•un is mad!o by Pr. Naylor in his brief that, even
",.; r IH• Jurisdiction to modify his support

9

obligations, modification wlis not
this contention upon factual

»'" ·"' in this case.

liJ•i'

t !101

i

He bases

are contrary to both the

evidence adduced at the ln!il arid thP firn1rngs of fact entered by the
trial court.
For example, Dr. Naylor contends (App.

Br. at 10) that "his

net pay per month is increased to only $3, 170, a rather small increase"
over the $2, 600 per month at the time of the original decree.

In

reality, however, the Dist.rict Court found that Or. Naylor's "gross
annual income is $83, 000 and based upon his 1981 tax return his net
after-tax income is $75,000 a year."

(Findings '11Ca), R. at 130.)

These findings are consistent with Dr. Naylor's own testimony.
59, R.

;,.1.

;;•iA.)

(Tr. at

The $3,170 figure mentioned in Dr. Naylor's brief is

presuMably based upon his $5, 000 per month base pay less state and
federal rnx withholding.

However, the statement is grossly misleading

because his brief fails to mention that for 1981, Dr. Naylor received
tax refunds totalling $26,902.47.

(See, Exhibit D-5.)

Similarly,

Dr. Naylor's tax refunds for 1980 totalled almost $20,000.
Exhibit 0-4.)

(See,

Thus, wher1 Dr. Naylor's .after tax income is considered

(found by the District rourt lo be $75,000 a year), Dr. Naylor's net
income has actually more !hetn douhle<1 from $2, 600 per month at
the time of the original dec>ree to more
modification hearing.

MoreovPr

w ,,,.,.,

$h. fJOO at the time of the
1

1.,

contributions made on Tlr. Naylor's t.,,lwl!

!()

t"'ns10n and profit sharing
Hr>e

also considered, his

'"' """'

''"'' m .. 1 ,,
_;,=!t ·,•

than

tr1 1.1, .1

in circumstances.

··){(1181

,,.,11/

si11ce the original decree was entered.

it .. , District Court found that the increase in

Nay ivr's i;" · irne. "'h1ch the parties had anticipated at the time of
original Jpcree, had not come to fruition.
t011

In fact, while her after

rneume at the time of t.he original decree had been $702 per month,

r1er current income at the time of the modification hearing was only $720
per month befo•e taxes.

(Findings U(b), R. at 130.)

Moreover, infla-

tiun together with the fact that Dr. Naylor's son has now entered his
teen-age years, has substantially increased Mrs. Naylor's expenses,
which were approximately $2,180 per month at the time of the modificatlon hearing.

(Findings at lll(c), R. at 130-31.)

These precise factors (husband's increased income coupled with
mcreascd livmg expenses due to inflation) were held by this Court to
Justify modificat10n of alimony and child support obligations in Wiker
,, , Wiker, 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978).

-·-------

In that case, this Court held:

li nder present inflationary trends and lapse of time
in between awards, the continued illness of [the
wuE') together with the fact that [the husband's]
salarv has greatly increased, we cannot say the
coL'rt abused its discretion.
lillil I'

''1 al

,11·· '"' iPn '"

i

5.

.1-,..

'""

:·•11

"'

Likewise. the District Court did not abuse its
presPnt case in modifying the alimony and support
Nn·ilut·

,,.,._,,,,

""view of the fact that his income has

111<-'

lacr that inf1at1on and the age of his son

11

have increased the month!v c"xpPP'c"'' ", "' rPd by Mrs. Naylor, and the
fact that the anticipa1ed increase m her toicnme has not materialized.

POINT III.

THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED ARE APPROPRIATI

BUT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL AWARD REPRESENTH
THE FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL.

The District Court found that Mrs. Naylor was "without funds
with which to pay her attorney" (Findings '!!3, R. at 131) and entered
judgment against Dr. Naylor in the amount of $1,000 as his contribution
to those fees.

(Order 'i13, R. at 141-42.)

The finding of the District

Court was based upon the unrefuted testimony of Mrs. Naylor.
12, R

IH

(Tr. at

161.)
'" circumstances where one litigant in a domestic proceeding

lacks the financial wherewithal! to pay counsel, this Court has
repeatedly held that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate.

For

example, in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951),
it was pointed out that this Court had traditionally adhered to the

policy that:
The awarding of counsel fees as well as alimony was
in the discretion of the trial court, and that a
finding of the trial court would not be set aside
in the absence of an abuse of such discretion.

It was error for the
counsel fees whict1 artc

"<lUrt

tr,

prnl u•

]')

,i, ny
th!' (wife]
"er costs pendente

' ' " ' ' ' '""'"ld
cu•li.1111lcf1

l!tP
I
I

k

! l ,., '

•hfe wii1

have been required before the

P. rr-i,, I .,ourt's failure to award attorney's fees to

ht'F, - R7

reversed in Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah

""'·

!rl 31'.l, 42, F 2d '-'l4

(i!olbi

278 P. 2d 98 J ( 19:)) 1 -

1,

and Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82,

rne award of counsel fees to Mrs. Naylor by the

Dislticl r:ourt was entirely appropriate.
Due to Dr. Naylor's dissatisfaction with the District Court's
rnodific11tion of his alimony and support obligations, Mrs. Naylor has now
been burdened with thP additional costs of this appeal.

This Court has

frequently held that, in such circumstances, a further award is
appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the dissatisfied
party's appeal.
< i:tah

For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104

1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award,

appealeu with the usual contention that the property distribution was
unfau and inequitable.

The original decree was affirmed and the case

r 0 mH 11ded to the trial court for the assessment of the additional

atlurney's fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal:
lnasinuch as the [wife] has been put to the
necessity of defending this appeal, which we
ha" e found to be without merit, it is our
np1nwn thac she is justified in her request
fo1 " further award of attorney's fees
l ,,
I

r

r'

I

I'

t

1 he

same effect is Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d

'

13

As a result of this A.pf''.081
tial additional expense.

\11.,.

t·!11ylor hfls incurred substan-

The conteolwns ra1c,Pd hy Dr. Naylor in this

appeal are insubstantial and he should bear the cost of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The principal contention raised by Dr. Naylor is that, since
the original alimony was for a specific number of years, the District
Court lacked the jurisdiction to modify that award.

The Legislature has

clearly stated that the District Courts retain jurisdiction in all
domestic relations matters to make appropriate modifications in the
event that there is a significant change in the circumstances of the
parties.

f11is Court has consistently adhered to the principle that the

alimony pr·>V!&JOns of a divorce decree may be modified, upon a showing
of subst8ntial change of circumstance warranting that modification,
regardless of the nature of the original decree and regardless of
whether it was based upon a property settlement and stipulation.

Thus,

there is no merit to Dr. N aylor's principal contention.
Dr. Naylor also contends that there was not a sufficient showing of changed circumstances, claiming that his income has risen from
$2,600 per month to only $3,170 per month.

This contention simply

ignores the evidence presented at the trial court and omits such
important factors as to ren<ier it grossly mislear!ing.

In reality,

Dr. N aylor's net. after-tax incomto ot Ir, - 11m·· of the modification hearing was in excess of $6, 000 per r.1or>t h and, rn Hddition to that amount.
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sut•st1<nt1al her1eflfs including the use of a modern automo-

rP•'P,,,_,rJ

and rwns1m1 anrl pre.fit-sharing contributions equaling nearly 25

p;c"rent of

t111o;

gr-os" !w:ome>.

On the other hand, Mrs. Naylor's income

has i;hown no sign1f1c1Jnt increase. although substantial increases were

antic1pa1Nl at the time of the original decree.

Moreover, Dr. Naylor's

son has now reached his teens and inflation has taken its toll, forcing
rs. Naylor to borrow more than $13, 000 from her parents in order to
meet current expenses.

Under such circumstances, the modifications

ordered by the trial court were not only justified, they were
necessitated.
The District Court awarded Mrs. Naylor $1,000 toward her
counsel fees.

That award was proper. since the unrefuted evidence

adduced at the modification hearing demonstrated that she was without
the financial wherewithal! to pay her counsel.

Unfortunately, addi-

tional fees and costs have been incurred as a result of this appeal.
Those fees shoulrl also be borne by Dr. Naylor and the award of additionlll fees should be ordered by this Court.

In all other respects,

the modification ordered by the District Court must be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
DART
By

By
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this ::t/!day of August, 1983.
l

STEGALL

day of August, 1983, I
placed two copies of the fongo111g 1'EspoW1Pnt's Brief with The Runner
Service to be delivered to Waller IL Ellett, attorney for plaintiffappellant, 5085 South Stale Street, Murray, Utah

lh

84107.

